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"For next year 1n Jerusalem." Those words have a place
on every JewLah holiday, In every Jewish religIous
ob:servance, and are even spoken In every Jewish prayer. In
the Soviet Union as In other countries, the Holy Land forms
a true ba.sh fOl; the Jewll1h faith. But perhaps In the
Soviet Union, MFor neKt year In Jerusalem- La spoken with
MOte anticipation than elsewhere In the world. Since 196',
the Jews of the U.S.S.R. have been leaving their ho~eland
to return to what they consider to be their real home--the
state of Israel. Pe"klnq first In 1979 with 51,000 Jews
e=lqratlnq. and then with a tremendous surge In 1990 of
over 200,000 e=lqratlnq, there eKlsts what one can only
term an exodus of the Jewish people from the Soviet Union.
ThIs exodus, fot seveu,l teasons, Is beneficIal fot the
three major parties Involved: the Soviet UnIon, whIch Is
findinq a new way to look at those of the Jewish faith even
while bestowing upon them the freedom to leave Its
confines; the Soviet-Jewl:sh emiqrants, who now have the
freedom to seek for whatever reasons a different way of
life than they have known; and the state of l:sulel. a
nation founded upon the idea of betoll.!nq a homeland and
safe haven fot Jews around the world.
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Plitt I: Development ~nd Deter.lnaeian of
the Jewish Katlonal Consciousness
Certainly the rise of the Jewish national consciousness
is a pIvotal issue when one considers an exodus of such
magnitude. There are many factors to be considered when
tracIng thIs rise throuqh history. The ascendancy of a
~JewLsh Identity· appears to be very much dependent on the
treatment or, rather, the ~istleatment of the Jews as a
separllte ethnic geeup. And the cultural background and
ethnic identity which kept II nation of people cemented
together when they were, In effect, homeless Is very much
enhanced when they actually acquire II land of thelt own.
ay tracing the formative factors--includlnq governmental
leq151atlon, "ocial organi%atlon, and out"ide
considetatlon,,--to the pre"ent, one may plot the
developMent of a Jewi"h natlonal con"clou"ne"" and con"ider
Lts im.pUcatlon".
Throughout practlcally the entlre cour"e of hl"tory,
the Jews have been con"tantly harried and maUgned. In
1127, following a precedent set flrst in fourteenth century
England, then in France, and then In Spain in the sixteenth
century, the Ru""ian "tate expelled the Jewish people. The
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eauses ranged fro. the sinqular threat they posed to a
growing Russian ~tlonal consciousness to the growth of
Christianity. Th1s event set the stage for centurIes of
Russian and Sovl~ anti-SemitIsm.
As the Muscovite state eVOlved Into the Ruaslan Emptre,
the perceived tht~at by the Jewish people to the
nationalist Identity eased somewhat. To",y were permitted
back In the coun~, but the areas In which they were
allowed to setUe were restricted. Under CathetlrH~ II, the
te[ll' ~P"le of the Jewl!:!h Settlelllent~ was first used. It
4eflned the .re.s In which the Jews could dweLL freely.
Under SUbsequent rulers, the ·Pale of the Jewish
Settle.ent- contLacted or expanded to fit the particular
need of the day. ~lexander I issued the most restricted
decree, statin." t::l:lat all Je.... lIlust Live in urban areas
within the bounda%ies of the old "Pale.-
Towards the end of the Imperial reqlme, the controls
placed upon the Jews became much harsher. Under Alexander
II and Alexander III they were the subject of a ."roup of
measures known as the Kay La..... These requlations aqain
II.ited the possible settle....nts of the Je.... to town$ and
yllla."e$ wIthin the ·Pale·; they restrIcted Je.... fro.
conductlnq busInes$ on Sunday$ and ChrIstian holidays; and
they outlIned a quota $y$te. for Jewish entrance to
secondary schools and universities. The quota syste. was
set up because Jewish students ·were 'quick in joinin." the
ranks o"f the revolutlonary workers. '."- After years of
J
•repression, the May Laws elicited some lnterestlng
["spons"" .
The fIrst reply to the constant [epresslon ~a" a ~5t
eminently logical one: tn" Jewtl fled the country. In the
lattet half of the nineteenth century, thell! Wete
approKlmately four million Jews Ln the RussIan €mplre. 2
r.estet Eckman, founder of he Juo:1alc Resell[ch Inlltltute,
"stlmat"s that by 1915 fully two mill Lon Jews had
ellllgrated. 3 Although frel! emigration was "trictly
forbidden, any Jew wishing to .ave west would almost
certainly be granted an eXlt vis•.
The second [espons" was somewhat more complicated and
was not exactly 11~ltl!d to the Russian Jews. Thls wa" thl!
development of various social movements, the one of
paul.QUnt importance being that of 21on15ll1. J .S.
Seheehtman, a leadlnq member of the Jewish Aqency and the
\oIorld J"wish Conqress, points out that the f1rst meetlnq of
HovflvfI! Zion (Lovers of Zion) occurred In 1664, thirteen
years before the first Zionist conference In Basel.· Thus,
Zlonlsll' had sOme of Its deepest roots In Ru""la. Indeed,
as Schechtman aqaln not"", the majorlty of the forty
settle_nts that existed In PalestLne before World war I
were of Russian orI91n.-
The formative tenets of Zlonlslll were quite simple: the
Jews should have a national homeland once ,,-qaln; their
homeland should be where the ancient state of Israel was;
and eventually the world's population of Jews would live In
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"that nation. There we.t" sevetaL factions within the
Zionist movement, but by and large thes" basic belIefs were
constant.
The fact that a large pottion of the Jews in Russia
wanted to form a separate nation did not seem to overly
alarm the government; howev"" the effect of Zionism on
the ordinary Russian was extreme. Zionism to the everyday
Ivan on the stleet was regarded as an insidious plot by the
Jews, already the source of all problems, to take Over the
world. The first step--the militant organization of the
Jewlsh people--was already underway. The .tumors did much
to Cause social unease and were often extreme enough to
cause .tlotlng and vicious pogroms. c
Zionism, the most important responsive socIal movement,
was still only one movement. Some of the JeW$ took a very
opposite viewpoint and turned to a socIalist or Russian
natlonallst Jewry as an answer to the represslon by the
TSiUS. These Jews, the most prominent of which formed a
politIcal party known as the Farelnlkte, were to play an
instrumental part In the overthrow of the Tsarlst regIme.
They still believed there was hope for a viable Jewish
faIth in the RussIan EmpIre, and all that was requIred to
make that hope a reaiity was the soclal and polItical
change found In revolution.
with a massive wave of continuing emigration, and a
social situatIon fIlled wIth ZIonist or natIonalist
organizations, the Russlan Empire headed lnto the First
,World War and .I revolution WhIch ,,",'lId chillnqe the poll tical
atmosphere of the natIon forever. With the overthrow of
NIcholas II and the toppllnq of the ProvL$lonal Oove"tnlllent,
Vladl.er Lenin, leader of the Soviets, brouqht his Ideas
and 1d,,,0109Y to the Russian Jewish scene.
LenIn
WIth Lenin's advent to power, the Jews appeared to be
in a better posLrlon th..n ever before. Lenin cl ... ll'I",d that
he was a leader for the oppressed--and WhO was .ore
opprea:sed than the Jews? II'" advocated e"luallty to all
people, and he promised them a new kind of freedom. In his
own poLitical party there were several pro.ln",nt Jews. In
fact, anti-Semites tended to equate communism with the
feared Jewish world consplu.cy. ~ and If the entire
comaunlst -ove~nt ~ould be mistaken as ~ ~ompletely Jewish
occurrence, surely this boded well for the Jews. The
facts, however, fall" to bear out this conclusIon.
Even thouqh Karl Karx was a Jew, he was bltrerly
anti-Semltic.- LenIn usually followed Karx's teachlnqs.
He was not opposed to ~hanqlnq those teachings to suit his
needs, thouqh. In the ~ase of the Jews, Lentn ~ould not afford to
be ~ntl-Semttic for praq~tt~ reasons, and he did not
choose to be ~nti-semttic for philosophical reasons. One
of the puc:tlcal reasons was thet a qood part of the
Co~unist Party wes compoaed of Jews, usually those RussIan
,natlonallst" exemplified by the me"'bets of the Facelnlktt:.
A second WliS thlle he needed and wanted a unHle:d Soviet
nation, and overt anti-Semitism was dIametrically opposed
to unification. Philosophically, the idea of anti-Selllitism
was, to Lenin, II qreat hindrance to the equality he "ought.
Although Lenin apPolled antl-Selllltls111, his position "liS
a bit mote narrow than most people perceived.
Anti-Sellllt!"", was singling Out the Jew just because he was
a Jew. 1'hls, Lenin W"",, ",qalnst. His feelings regardlnq
what actually went Into being a Jew was a different story
aLtoqether. 1'h" Jewl:5h cultural heritage was a hlndtllnce
to nat tOnal assllllilatlon, and thus all the Jewish schools
and ttadltlons "hould be done away with. Religion was not
tolerated In a Communist country; the Jewish ways of
wonhlp had to d1e. Uonlsm, w1th Its dream of a totally
separate JeWIsh nation, was a definite hindrance to Soviet
assi~lli!ltion and nationalization, ~nd could not be
tOler.ted.
Under Lenin, 1..... were pa•• ed -.hing ZionIsm, and
indeed all Jewish polItical partIes, lilegeal. Jew1sh
InstItutions were dismantled, synagogues closed, and their
posse•• ions u:propr1ated. Everyone under eighteen ...s
prohibited £roJa receiving a re11gious education outside the
hOlle. Ironically, IIlOst of these decrees were either
suggested or carried out by Jewish Communist,.
It can be argued that this was one o~ the Lowest ebbs
for the JewIsh national consciousness. The Jewish people
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"'",re spLit Into two very anta90ntstlc faction,,: The
Co.-unl"t" and the Zionists. The unity <jlven to the JewIsh
people as they souqht to weather Tsarlst discrimination
,,"''''.eel but a ~emory now as hope took the JewIsh people In
two different directions. The daMaqe done to the Jewish
IdentIty was all the mOre obvIous when One realizes that
Lenin, by <Jttacklnq the rellqlon aond the traditions of the
Jews. W5S attacking thos", very thIngs whIch had served as
their strength and chelt stay throuqh centuries of
persecution under the Tsars.
stalln
Under Stalin, the Soviet-Jewish national consciousness
made perhaps mOr'" solidifying 'lain" than under any other
leader. During the first few yu',s. there was II continued
attack carrled out by the Jewlsh Communists on the existing
1lonist organizations. Around 1'30, however, such
harassment dropped to ah,ost nothing. A propaganda
ca.-palgn was launched Instead, Its purpose .erely to re.lnd
the non4Jewa of the evLls of tlonis •. The official Party
llne wall that tlon1s. was dead,- but for sOme reason, the
propaganda campalgn aqalnst it continued.
W1th the outbreak of World War II, the party had to
take notice of 1ionis", once again. With the annexation of
portionll of Poland, BeSllllrllbill, Northern Bukov1na, Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania the Soviet unton added well over two
,mIllion Je_ to its populatIon. Mote than that, these Jews
had not experienced the SovIet assault on ~e..lsh cultural
identity. When the :zapildnlkl, the Westerners, came Into
contact With their culturally deprived nelqhboIs, they were
able to revive th.t Jewl$h spirit. :ticl'll:l1. was induced
Into the SOViet-Jewish blOodstream like a
vacclne--tr.nsfDt~lnq the ailing Jewish culture into
somethlnq that the Jews could again be proud of.
Stalin rude conllclous contributions ,HI well. As a ploy
to gain worldwide support fot the Soviet cause, he
publlcally eased his stance on the Jewish situation. ~e
even sent Jewish envoys to plead for Zionist understanding
and sympathy for the Soviet war effort. Ae a rlarural
outgrowth of thIs strategy, StalIn had to declare hls
support for a Jewish state In Palestlne. 8y the U_e the
war was over, StalIn was touting a pro-JewIsh polIcy.
The SOViet Union now llned up to back the Jewish state
of Israel, and In 1948, :lust after the creatlon of the
state of Israel, the USSR rece1ved her fIrst Israeli
delegation, headed by Golda Hdr. The outpouring of :loy
and the demonstrations held In her honor served
l~presslvely to solidIfy the Sovlet Jews.
At the same time StalIn was pUblicly on the JewIsh
side, he was stIll executlng or exilIng II slgniflcant
portion of the hlghest ranking Jewish leaders. As soon as
Ks. Kelr left the Soviet Union, Stalin had any Jew who had
taken part In the deMOnstrations either locked up or
4
exiled.'" Emigration to l~rael was barred; Schechtman
5tates that "from 15 Hay 1948, till the end of 1951, only
four old women and One disabled ex-serviceman "'ere
permitted to leave for Israei.""-"-
This peculIar type of hidden anti-Semitlsm contInued up
until StalIn's death. When the news was announced of the
"Ooctor's Plot," the ~lx Je",s invoived were charged as
beIng "Zionist sple".""-" In the la"t years of hi" life,
Stailn had ailo",ed relations with Israel to cooi
considerably. Ho",ever, no", that SovIet Jews knew that the
Jewish state exIsted, they seemed magnetically drawn
together In what can only be described as a national Jewish
identity. The beginnings of the Je"'lsh national
consciousness was laid, fueled by Israel's exIstence but
with its roots far back in the days of the Tsars.
1953-1968
Under G. Halenkov, InterIm le"der of the Soviet state,
the grIpping waves of anti-Semitism ceased for a brief
whIle. When N. Khrushchev, leader of the USSR untIL 1<;68,
took over, there "'as a slow but inexorabie return to
antI-Semitism. Khrushchev seemed to share StalIn's polley
when it came to the Jewish question: publicly deny any
knowledge of anti-SemitIsm but In secret do as much to the
Jew as possible. Eckman propose~ that While
de-StalInlzation was a primary goal of Khrushchev's, he
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still had to appease the Patty hard-liners who had approved
of stalin, and thus he did nothlnq to help the Jews.~~
Whether or not this was the casl!, It Is a fact that
Khrushchev was challenql!d openly several times about his
[,,£,,:oals ""en to let families be united In Israel, and he
always avoided thl! IS5UI!.~4
During the "Thaw" after Stalin, Jewish national
consciousness surfaced, and the Jewish people werl!
obviously dls:satlsfll!d with life In the Soviet Union.
Laurie Sallran, chait of the W. Averell Harriman
Institute'" Seminar on Soviet Republics and Reqional
Is"ues_ poInts out, that the typical Soviet Jew 5tl11
waited for do-e"tlc: [dorms up untll 1961-68, and It was
not "ntll the SovIet govI'!rnaent took a pro-Arab and
aot1-["t5ell stance In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and
subsequently Invaded C:echoslovakia that the JewIsh people
began to reall:e that there was no hope for a peaceful
JewIsh exIstence In the Soviet Unlon.~· It was at thIs
tIme that the Soviet government began allowing emigration
of PolIsh Jews, and with the Poles as an example, the rest
of the Soviet JeW$ queued up to emigrate. The first
contemporary wave of emIgratIon was on.
--~..
The first wave of eJalqratlon encolllpassed the period
ftOIll 1968 through 1914, beginning after a total embargo
that followed the Six-Day War. In 1968, a totlll of only
229 Jews were permitted to e",lgrate; in 1969, the number
grew to 2,9?9.~ Peillklnq In 1973 with 34,733, the number of
emigrants reached, comparatively, mas,," proportlons.-
There were several Soviet requirements for
participation Ln this first. WoJve: one hoJd to be invit.ed by
a relative then llvlnq in Israel; and one had to apply for
oJn exit vlaa, which ent.oJlled obtalninq a referral letter
f:o_ an e_ployer. Aft.er these condltlons Were fllled,
e_iqration waa only aa far away oJ" 'l"overnmental approval of
the oJppllcat1on. If the applicat10n were approved, then
oJll that WoJS left to do wa" to heoJd to vlenn", Or "ome
other connection point, and tr"nsfer to " plane he"ded for
The Fiest W.,ve
The period frolll 1968 untll U'.lO was characterized by
SOme dramatic changes In the Soviet government's attitude
to..,,"rd the Jews. A total of three distinct waves of
Soviet-Jewish emigration occurred, each with Its specific
causes.
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Part: II: Eal<JI:atlon feOIa ;,. Soviet Standpoint;
Policy, ca.."..", and Effects
12
13
tstael.
The official policy of the Soviet qoYern~ent allowed
..aiqu,tlon solely for the reunification of faailles, hence
the prerequisite of an invitation. In actuality, the
Soviet ~tiYI! at that tim" Ls SOMewhat difficult to
discern. Old the Soviets allow the Je.... to e ... lqrlllte
because of Jewish agltatlon1 Ot did the Soviets perMit
their departure because foreign policy made It desirable?
L,,',lfle P. Salltan develops the forDler theory, basically
statlnq that the Je.... were allowed to leave because of the
trOUble they ",",[l! causLnq. She proposes that the SavLer
government realized that by allowing II few of the mote
socially animated Jews to leave, social, economic, and
political benefits could accrue. The government theorized,
In this scenario, that tht!!y would let a few of the
activists leave befoIt!! tht!!!r actions became an example to
otheIll, thus ridding theIDSt!!lves of a destabilizing
elelllent. 3 Salltan a150 points out that the first W<1lve
Includ.-d IIlollny elderly and Influ. elligrants, and that they
represented the least economically valuable segment for the
Soviet Union.' An econollic benefit occurred, therefore,
because costly pension funds could now be diverted to DOre
useful economiC concerns.
The second theory deals with forelqn polley. Ourlnq
tht!! late sixties and early seventies, a desire for detente
with the United States was a very Important Soviet
priority. Their pursuit of SALT I Is evidence of this
HInterest, and Lta e"use ma.y partly lie in the Soviet fear
of Improved Slno-Amerlcan friendship. In this theory,
known as the barometer thesLs, soviet neqotiators realized
that Increased e~19ratlon was conducive to II relaxed
International atmosphere. The barometer thesis also traces
Soviet-American relations through the periods of Jewish
e~iqratIQn, and seeks to draw II direct relatLonship between
the two. The wara.,r Soviet-American relations, the higher
the emigration totals,- Certainly the argument Ls fairly
easy to substantiate with reference to emigration
statisticS and U.S.-SovLet trade, and for the most part It
Ieaalns apparently error-free. The theory Is not, however,
entirely without fault.
Saittan, ~ddresslng the barometer thesis directly,
points out sevetal na_ In lts basic assullptions. She
asserts th,U given the perspective of time, it is unlikely
that emlqratlon would have endu~ed if It had been dl~ectly
linked to u.s. rel~tlons. FOt example, ellliq~ation began
seve~al ye~tS befote detente bec~me ~ slqnlflcant factot.
Despite close sctutlny by the West, Jewish dissidents Wete
constantly ~nd consistently h~tassed. Flnally, the Sovlet
attitude towatd Jewl.h cultutal and tellqious l1fe ~e... ined
hatsh, and qrew even more hostile as exposure to the West
Increased.-
Whatever its causes, the first wave ended in 1973. One
hlsto~ian, writing during the period of the first wave,
states that the Soviet qovernment had three methods of
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discou, ..qlnq ~.. Iqratlon: -antl-ISlaeli and antl-ZLonlst
propaganda, ha~sm..nt of those applying for ...I'Oratlon
visas, and repression In tile 'form of arre"ts and trlals.·~
The propllqanda callie In two for=, anti-Semitic <lnd
anti-IsraelI. The Soviet qovetn~ent began checklnq the
degree to which v15a applicants were related to the I"suers
.._~ .~ '_edtat", famlly relationship, they would deny the
-I
of their invitations to Israel. If the relationship was
refused applicant, because he or she had mote than likelyI
.."pllcant oS vLsa. This w", e~trelllely serious for the
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lost <J job when asking for the necessary referral Letters.
Thus was created a ,obless qroup of refuseniks. The Soviet
government also began holding oJ serIes of show trIals,
apparently aimed at curbing the emigration of scientists
and engineers." These measures had the l.medlate effect of
dropping emigration levels, but there was now an
undercurrent of domestLc tens Lon which would Inevltably
find an outlet.
The Second w.. ..e
The second wave was the result of the internal tensionI
I created by the ending of the first. It is doubtfui whether
SovIet authoritIes believed that by atte~pting to release
only certaIn promInent actlvlsts that they would lnsplre
the rest of the Jew1sh population to do so. However, this
15 eKactly what h<Jppened. The hostile cU.ate created by
"the Sovlet policy only ~e~ved to in~pi~e and enco~raqe
other Jews to leave. OU~ing the years 1975 th~ough 1977,
Sovier JewLsh e_igration ave~aged around 14,000 a yea~, &
substantial numbe~, but stl11 a d~op fro_ the over 30,000
In 1972-13. However, by 1979, SovLet Jewish emigration had
reached an all-time high of 51,320 emiqrant5.~
The second wave was little .o~e than an outgrowth of
the first, although lt would co.e to dwarf its p~edecesso~
in magnitude. SovLet reaction to the threat of mass
emlg~atlon in 1973 was to clamp down, usIng methods which
have already been o~tlined. The Lntenslfled pressu~e on
the Soviet Jews, ln their increasingly hostile environment,
served only to make them want to leave. Even with the
threat of joblessness and anti-Semitic ha~assment, soviet
Jews lined ~p to emigrate. The n~mber of visa applicants
g~ew steadl1y fro_ 1975 to 1979, and the Soviet gove~n.ent
ulti.ately let the. leave.
Fi~st and foremost, the Soviet government per_ltted the
emiqration because a c~ackdown on the entire Jewish
popUlation, eltho~gh not without p~ecedent, was decidedly
not feasible. Second, the ~esult of the officially
spon50~ed antI-Se_ltle p~opaganda was an Increase In ethnIc
tensLons, and emLgration served in a small way to reduce
that tension. One addItional reason was that with a
significant po~tlon of the Jewish Jntell1gent~ja leaving,
places in universities and other 1.po~tant job
oppo~tunitles were opening up, and a process of national
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assimilation co~ld take ~Lac~ wlth these vacant positions
going to natIonal ellt••. ~o
These openIngs Ln the educated elite, however, caused a
great deal of governmental concern. Taking steps to ensure
that the SovLet Union was not hurt by the mass emlgratLon
of the Jews, the KremlIn began denying Jews entrance to
unlversttLes Ln excess of the already strLngent quotas. In
1968, one-thIrd of the Jewish populatIon was
unLverslty-educated, compared wlth only four percent of the
total popUlation. But, from 191' to 19'9, not one Jew
was ad~ltted to the faculty of mathematLcs at Moscow State
UnIversIty. From 1919 to 1980, only four Jews were a part
of the 400-S00 students annually enrolled.~~ The
government was tryIn9 to Wean the country from the
extremely dense content of Jews In mental (um5t~venyll
labor posltIons.~2 DespIte thIs precautIon, SovIet
authorItIes once agaIn felt the need to clamp down on the
Jewish exodus.
EmIgration fell consIstently throughout IgeO, 50 that
by the end of that year only 21,~71 Jews were allowed to
e~Igrate.~2 This trend contInued through 1ge6, when only
gl4 Jews e.lgrated.~4 Proponents of the barometer thesis
advance several arguments for thl5 second, and much mOre
severe, restrIctIon. The UnIted States had conslstently
denied the Host Favored NatIon trade status to the SovIet
Union since 1974. FurtherMOre, the mass emigration of 1'7'
went al~at totally unnotIced by President Jimmy Carter.~·
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This ..y have angered the Soviet leadership Into 4
hardening of theIr positIon. TholQOs Haylor, Professor of
E:conomlcs and Business Administration at Duke Unlv<'!Islty,
comments that between 197~ and 1982 the Whole fabrIc of
detente came unraveled bec,,"use of Lssues such- as Angola,
Afghanistan, Poland, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrei
Sakharov, the Soviet natural-gas plpelLne to western
Europe, and last but not least, the at~ race.~· Opponents
of the barometer thesis cIte this saM", material and ask why
it took until 1980 for such serious .atertal to have any
"ffl!ct.~·
Looking at the Intern"l tension thesh, one finds other
explanatLons for the drasUc drop In emigration durIng the
eighties. Salltan points out that the scale of the mass
eXOdus could not be ignoted in the eighties, because it was
a tillle fot declinIng econolllIc and populatIon growth in the
Soviet Union. Havlnq teallzed that f ....ily teunlflcatlon is
a never-ending process, the government had to act when 12.7
percent of the Jewish population had already emiqrated.~.
Salltan also theorIzes that the Soviet tegime felt the need
to assett control OVet is ptoblem which It probably assessed
as out of hand.~·
The ThJrd "'ave
The thIrd wave of Soviet Jewish elllIgtatlon began In 1987.
During that yeiSt, there was is definIte thaw in
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Sovlet-~erIC4n relatIons. In Dece~et of 1981, President
Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and Soviet leader MikhaIl
Gorbachev came together for a thIrd summit meeting. Also
In oeceaber 1987, aore Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate
than durIng any other month since 1981.~o The e~odus had
begun.
There were several reasons to belIeve that the thaw in
SovIet ealqratlon policy 45 of 1987 was a temporary
meaSUre. The Internal tension thesis would assert that
Gorbachev was basically trying to get rid of a small
portIon of hIs population which was jobless (as a result of
their visa applications) and lnherently worthless to the
Soviet economy. AppeasJng ~estetn nations clamoring for
tree ealqtatlon further reco..ended the idea, sO he very
wisely let the refusenIks emigrate. Once they were gone,
he could aiways tighten the contrOls and keep home the more
valuable members of the Jewish community (the engineers and
sclentistsl.~~ This argument formed the basis for the
theory that Oorbaehev considered the emigration of the Jews
to be a temporary pheno.enon. Salltan adds that the
restriction of emigration to one group could lead to
greater demands to emigrate on the side of other ethnic
minorities, a situation she Is sure Corbachev Wishes to
avold.2~ With her arguments In ~Ind, one .ay conjecture
that Cor bache v originally intended this second wave of
Soviet JeW3 to be a temporary thing, and It Is because of
so.ethlng a~ln to the baro~ter thesIs that he cannot now
end the exodus. Observing the growing number of emigres,
world opinion has grown too strong, and there are too many
advantages occurring as a result of the emigration for
Gorbachev to stop It now. Moreover, the emigration has
become secondary to a domestic reform that has risen out of
the emigration controversy.
There are many indicators of a loosening in the overall
Soviet domestic scene during the years 1987-1990. Many of
these indicators deal specifiedly with Soviet Jewry. On 7
December 1987, the Soviet gove:rnment disbanded its offiCial
"Anti-Zionist Commlttee."~~ As a sign of reduced ten"ion"
on the lowest levels, ko"her food appeared in the official
state stores late in i987.~· And the growing number of
Jews permitted to emigrate "erves as an indicator of
domestic policy as well.
to. 1987, there we:re 8,1~5 total Jewl"h emigrant". In
1988, th'He were 18,961 emigrants, followed by 71,142 In
1989 and over 200,000 in 1990.~~ Not only did the number
of emigrants keep growing, but the magnitude of domestic
polley kept pace. In July 1988, a Soviet filmmaking team
attended the Jerusalem Film Festival, and for the first
time in history a Soviet government sanctioned films with
predominantly Jewish themes. 2 • Later that same month, the
first Israeli delegation to the Soviet Union in twenty
years arrlved.~~ In November of 1988, the Soviets, for the
first time since 1917, allowed Hebrew language classes to
be officially taught. 2 • In February 1989, Jewish cultural
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cente." were: legall:ted. The fl.st opened In Hoscow that
same month, followed by Jewish cultural orqanizations in at
least a dozen clti." at the end of 19a9.~· In OCtober
1990, the head of the antl-S"..ltic q:roup PalJtyat, In a court
case ·without precedent In the USSR," was tried and
convicted of sttu"lng up ethnic hlltred, and sentenced to a
two-year telm in ,all,sa
As one flnal example of what lIlust be conside::ed the
greatest Iehabilitation of an ethnic qtOUP ever, there Ls
the subject of direct plane fl1qhts to Israel. Since 1980,
Israel has aSked for direct flights fro .. the Soviet Union
to Is[ael to prevent the lo..s of Jewish elJtlqtants going to
places besides I5.&81 (the so-called drop-out phenomenon).
For years the Soviet govern~ent refused, saying that such
flights would constitute ·coercion,·" and that the
~~igrants should hav~ the power of choice. On 29 Septe~er
1990, the Soviet Union agreed to direct fliqhts to Israel,
s~rvinq only to exe~plify how far Soviet-IsraelI relations
have come."
Despite the re~rkable number of positive indicators
occurring in the Soviet Union, there are still hints of ..
darker force, re~inders of a ti~e not yet -passed. In late
1987, the KGB resorted to their time-honored tactic of
force to Quiet a qroup of Jewish protestors." Even In
1990, anti-Semitism was a ma,or issue In the Soviet Union.
Early In February, the KGB Issued an appeal for calm to
counteract the rUmOrS and threats of pogroms aqainst the
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Jews. H AgaIn In July. Pravda contained an ,utlcle on how
.ntl-Se~it15. threatened to under.lne the political and
eeonoale tefor~ of the CDuntty.~· The fact that the
article was even written shows how far Soviet society has
co~e; but Its content underscores how far It still has to
,..
The examples of what 1", in effect, the rehabilitation
of Jewish culture, point out how h,Hd it wiLL be to "hut
the now open door. Free emigration Is taking place, and it
is only a 519naL and a symbol of what may yet happen. The
,,It.-te necessary for such emlqratlon as Is occurring is
danqerQusly two·£"ceted: the door lIIust be open, and the
leaders of the Soviet state lIIust dealre to keep it open;
however, there lIIust be a reaSOn that so aany Jews want to
l."ve. Be that all It l'lli!IY, one cannot help but 111010 the
posItive cultuc"l ceforms of which the Jewish e_lqratlon
hall been a catalyst, and believe thi!lt the Jewish Exodus has
been a positive occurrence in the SOViet Union.
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p~(t Itt: Th~ SGYi~t Jewish Em19~ant
While the mere fact of Jewish ethnic identity indicate.
certain accepted characteristics, a closet look at
lllalgI.tlon p"tteCl;ll points to an even IDOre exclusive set of
._lqrant-speclfic traits. The l1Ioat important of these
Identifying components includes a general aqreement on
point of orig-ln, ., .... :$on for lu,vinq, ... nd final destlnatlon.
Through the COUrse of modern Soviet Jewish emigration.
there has been a de~lnlte shift In emlgration compositlon,
especially with teqatd to these three categories.
Until 1974, emigration from the Soviet Union was
basically driven by religious reasonll. Israel was
consldeted. the home of the Jewish people--thelr nation.
The Zionist background of the SovIet ~ews wa~ one of the
st~ongest IltOtlvato~~ fo~ ellllgr.tlng. Natu~ally, then, the
e.lg~...nt pool was made up of ~ews eOllllng fro .. tho.$e a~e's
where Zlonl~1lI was the strongest, namely the regions annexed
by the Soviets In World Wat It and the outlying, lea.$t
n... tlonal1zed (Russlfledl areas such as Georgia and Central
A.sla.~ In these dIstrIcts, the ~ews had been able to
resJst the natIonalization Which would have th~eatened
their Jewish cultural Identity, ...nd therefore had a stronq
"dll'l\rl! to ","lte wlth the state of Israel for truly Uonll1t
rea50ns.
Demographically, thl" pattern of the non-Sovietized Jew
15 d[.lUrie. Ninety-eight percent of the pre-19H
emigrants went to Israel.~ The bulk of this number came
from the Ie"" nationalized areas--thlrty five percent of
all Jews going to Israel caMe from Geor91a.~ where less
than 2.S percent of Sovlet Jews resided." The fact that
these early emigrants went to Israel, coupled with their
areaS of origination, certainly Indicates that they were
going primarily to fulfill their dream of being a part of a
Jewish nation, not -erely to escape the Soviet governaent
Or harsh economic conditions. About their later
counterparts, the same cannot be said.
In 1974 a ma'or turning point w~s re~ched In the
pattetn of Soviet Jewish emigration. In thill yeat the
percentage of Soviet Jews who did not go to Isr~el 'umped
ftom three percent to nineteen percent.- Thill figure
continued to tlse, teachlnq fotty-nlne petCent In 1'376, and
staylnq at ovet fifty percent fot the remainder of the
lIecond wave,- ThIs rapid upswlnq of "dropouts· wall
Indicative of s new type of emlqrant, one less concerned
with the Jewish state than with Individual safety and
welfare.
"The yeal 1974 "'as l"deed the cru:< of the situation.
During tht,. year, an e:<perl~ent of 50rts was conducted
among the emigrating Soviet Je~, an experiment designed to
meaSure the acceptance of ~dropDut5.- This exercise was
not planned in any way; it just occurred. Its results,
however, were conclu'IIlve. The SovIet qovermaent refused to
Issue an exit visa ... Lth any other listed final destination
than Israel.~ On the other hand, Soviet officials proved
quite willing to turn thelt heads Ln IlLenna If an eltigre
so.ehow boarded a plane to the United States. With 1914',.
considerable fLnal tally of a nineteen-percent dropout
rate, Jews In the Soviet Union knew that there was an
alternative to the Israeli route.
Evll'n wIth such a route avaIlable, why would a per,.on
de,.lre to pick up his f.Jllllly and IIIOve to another countty,
leaving his old friends, occupatIon, and nationality
behind? Jerome Gilllllan, an emigration speclallst, states
that ~The second wave of Soviet-JeWish emigratIon In the
seventies was Il.Ore a response to· worsening conditions In
the SovIet Union than to an allure of any particular
Jllternatlve.~- OILIlIl<In follo",," with a series of high
invectives agaInst the Soviet regime during the seventies,
characrerl:tinq the period as one of lost social dynamism,
led by aqed conservatIves who were "afraid of change,
afraId of new Ideas, engrossed In protectinq the status quo
and In rootIng out all opposltion,·- He ralls that the
absence of considered and meaningfuL ,.oclal goal,. re,.ulted
in a society centered on individuai success, contrary to
the official ideology of the Soviet :>tate. Such hypocrisy
led to the natural outgrowth of a corrupt and cynical
society.~o
On top of the increasingly unpleasant general social
scene, the Jews were victilMl of a vicious anti-Semitic
propaganda campaign. This tactic has been discussed In an
earlier section, and without repeating details, one may say
that for many Jews, it left them with an increased desire
to leave the Soviet Union.
With such conclusions In mind, the results of a survey
of late seventies' emigrants may be examined wtthout
surprise. ~When emigrants from this period were surveyed,
they cited discrimination on the basis of nationaLIty,
CUltural or political motivations, economic reasons, and
family reunification as Chief factors motivating their
decision to emigrate."~~ These reasons, taken togeth",r,
Indicate the typical "new" emigrant of the second wave.
As the catalysts for emigration changed, so did the
origins of the ",migrant pool. OIith religious reasons much
less weighted, nationalization had very little effect on
the decision to emigrate. What it did affect, however, was
the final destination of the emigrant. Seventy-two percent
of all emigres from Russia and the Ukraine, very
assimilated areas, went to the United States. On the other
hand, oniy six percent of the Georgians and thirteen
percent of the Central Asians went to the U.S.1~ With the
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growing pefl:entaqe of elllLqrants qolng to the U.S., Lt ls
obvious that there was a remarkable SUIge In the nu~e[ of
ellllqr",nts £rolll the ..s"llllilated areas. The surge occucred
in these densely packed areaS because the'll" were the Jews
who felt ~"t the dragging 50clal dynallllcs, who felt ~"t
the ",otl-5111111tlc propaganda call1paign, and who felt most the
lure of new opportunities. They saw an avenue of escape lo
the emigration of their more religIous cultural cousins,
and they saw new possibilities In a route to AmerLca.
When the thIrd wave of emigration began in 1987, the
chief motivating factors for emigration remained fairly
constant with what they were in 1979--£ea[ of
dlscrllll1nation, fear of a worsenlnq econOIll¥. and a deslte
fot farally teuniflcatlon. The rqjotity of Soviet Jewish
emlgtants Wete still co_ing to the U.S., and the majotlty
of those eralqtants otlglnated In the Uktalne and the
RussIan Republic.
Dlsctlralnatlon against the Jewish people 1n the late
eighties had sevetal new twists. Fot ptob.1bly the flut
tl." In hlstoty, the Jews Wete the vlctl~ of antl-Se.itla.
because they Wete leaVing. WIth so Illuch concetn placed on
the human tiqhts Issue of Jewish eralqratlon, the entire
populatLon of the SovIet UnIon was well aware of exactly
who was le/lvinq their countty. When emigration
"restriction" for ol",.." eased In 1')117, 4 seed of [esentla"nt
beqilln to grow In the Iaind" of nationalla-c" throughout the
Soviet "rate. '(evqeny Vellkhov. director of the Kutch.tov
InstItute of Atolalc Energy and melaber of the Central
Co_lttel!, states poLqnantly, "Sut if you want to talll
about emigration, why not put It In general terms--why
always, or m<llnly, In tel:lII'5 of Jew,,? Shouldn't everyone
have the right to leave the Soviet Unlon?"~3 He goes on
to reveal another source of resentment stemm!nq fto~ the
...l<;ratlon of the Jews, a probleJll known as "the brain
drain." Because the Soviet "ysteJll provided frel! education
and professional trainIng, a .l!~l!r of that system wa,
expected to feel $o-e SOtt of obligation to it. Therefore,
when a Jew chose to eml~rate, espeelally a well-edueated
Jew, Lt appeared as If that Individual was rene~ln~ on a
valid elalm to his manual and intelleetual resOurCeS.
Emiqration from thIs standpoint was siphoninq some of the
best minds out of the country, a problem, and the apparent
denial of obLlqation was causinq the build up of huqe waves
of resentment, another problem.~· To compound the Issue,
thIs resentment simply encouraqed other JeW$ to leave the
eountry.
The very real issue of ~the brain draIn~ can be seen by
lookinq at the occupations of Soviet Jews when they arrIve
In Israel. Completely unskilled labor accounts for only
twelve percent of Israeli immiqrants. £nqlneers and
technicians make up thirty-eiqht percent of those
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\l/UIllqrants, ....hile twenty-one percent of the l_lqrant:; ace
In academics. Eleven percent are In the medLc/ll field, and
the rest ace In market lng, admlnlstratlon, IIrt and sociaL
fields, lIervice positions, or otherwise skilled labor
e ..plo~ents.~· With such II concentrated nu-tl'H of educolted
people flowIng out of the country, the Soviets are not
imaqlninq -the brain drain- phenomenon.
In 1989, 10,000 Soviet Jews were /ll10w!!d to leave.
Only 12,000 of that number went to lUllel.'· The ma:\orlty
of the rest came to the U.S.~~ Also In 1989, President
Bush announced that the United States would no lonqer
consIder Soviet Jews as refuqees, and he set II ceiling for
total Sovlet I..Lqration at 50,000.'· Hade prl.arlly for
economic reasons, this announcement still came as a shock
for thousands of Jews wanting to emIgrate to the U.S.
rather than Israel. Be that as it mtty, the net Impact of
the new 1"""lgratlon [estrlctlon was to force the now
free-to-Ieave e~lgrant to go to Israel, as he was no longer
free to co_ to the U.S. Israel's _55 I.... igratlon was On.
Soviet Jews were still emigrating for better economic
conditions and because of antI-Semitism. Zionism was
barely a consideration. However, it seems that by forcing
the Soviet Jews to go to [srael, the U.S. also triggered iI
wave of Zionist feelings. These feelings were usually
_nlfested after a Soviet group arrived In Israel, but they
appeilred to be genuIne. Groups of transplanted Russians
could be seen singing songs of ~Zlonls~~ Ln [ellqlous
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meetings, even though by their own admission they had no
deep religiou5 feeling upon their departure from the Soviet
Unlon.~9
After Bush closed the door on the SovIet JeW3, many of
them stlll held out for ad_lsslon to the u.s. Over 30,000
applicants were on file at the u.S. embassy in Hoscow, with
another 30,000 on an Inforeal waiting list (Peat, The Hew
tork Timet, 3 September 1989, I, 1, 6). These determined
would-be ~rlcans saw (srael as overcrowded, dangerous,
and lacking In employment opportunities (more about
Israel's probleas In the neKt part I, but they still wanted
out of the Soviet union. That sentl~nt was shared by all
Soviet Jewish emigrants.
Israel Is II :state founded on lIl<lSS 1lllllllqratlon. The
destiny of the state has been described as the ~ho..eland
and "af .. hil"'en for Jews around the world. M1 When the lat'O"
influx of Soviet Jews beqan Ln 1966, the Israeli qovernlllent
rejoiced and welcomed the immigrants with open arms.
Twenty years later, with soviet Jews IIlUIl1gratlnq at record
rates, the Israelis have not changed.
The"e exists Ln a Israel a basic lIlytholo"lY, Its origins
founded in a picture of the holocaust survivors being
carried ashore on the shoulders of the Jewish priesthood
whUe an Illegal IlnlEllq1:atlon fleet lies beached on the
coast of their anchnt hO_lllnd. This set of belleh
accords that all Jewish t ..iqrsnts wl11 be welcomed, that
Isu.el I" the pl<tce of refuge for Jews, and th.. t [srael Is
their liIst, best hope.
From 1911 to 1990, almost four hundred thousand Soviet
Jews av.. lled thelll5elves of this last, best hope, and still
the state of Israel opened Its aras wid., encouraging and
at tlJaes even l ..plorlng the world's Jews to return once
/Igaln to the home that was agatn theirs. The growth of the
""tlo" of Isr"el, however, WillS not without Itll growl"'l
palnll.
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Part IV' Israeli Absorption of the Soviet Jews
J1
HousJnq
The ",ajor problelU with absorbing the Sovlet-Jewish
lmmlgrants had almost always centered around three
Issues--housing, employment, and the resettlement process.
Housing was an obvious lssue, as the number of people that
Israel can accommodate Is naturally limited by space. The
government had been in the process of renting temporary
housing and constructing permanent dwellings since the
magnitude of the Sovlet-Jewlsh lnflux was first feit. The
simple truth was that it could not keep up. Most
Immigrants were settled somewhere other than their first
choice because of space conslderations,~ and with the
torrent of Immigrants In 1990, new arrivals were as oEten
as not bedded down In tent towns, transIt camps, or in
large refugee compounds consisting of tin, WOOd, and canvas
huts. ~
Contrary to popular thought, the housing shortage did
not force the Soviet Jews to settle In the occupied
territories. Although housing was available there and such
housing was an alterna.tlve, a survey published In June of
1990 found only three thousand seven hundred Soviet Jews
living In the occupied territories, less than one percent
of Soviet-Jewish Immlgrant~.·
employment
The second major Issue concerning the Soviet-Jewish
Immigrants was unemployment or, more descriptively,
unsuitable employment. As already stated, the average
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Soviet 1_lq[&n[ ....5 "xtr" .... ly skilled, Jl Chal;Jlctl!rlselc
whIch became a proble.. when thosl! skills werl! nO longer
needed In the Israeli work force. For I!xalllpll!, Ln 1"0
Israel had three standing national symphony orchestras, •
number consLdered large even by the most liberal of music
lovers. According to the Israeli Embassy, enough Soviet
muslct,HIS had Landed by the end of 1990 to form an
additIonal five complete symphony oIche5t[as.~ Such an
Influx of talent would c,ntalnly bl! beneflclal for I5raeL
In the long run, but dealing ",lto the Skilled workers as
they arrived presented an eve[-qrowlnq problellt.
The proble. of employment was compounded not only by
thl! skill level of the SOViet-Jewish Illlllllqrants bllt abo by
their ag ... d ....oguphles. For exalllple, In 1990 the largest
port Lon of the hr\llligrants, 36 pereent, Wl!r'" ages 25 to 44,
the ag ... at whlch they ne...ded employment,- That statlstlc
translates to 66,024 new jobs "eeded In the country of
Israel in a sl"gle year. Such jobs as street sweeping,
long con:>1dered as "Arab work," were very much In demand by
Soviet Jews with few alternatives,~
The last _jor problela that Iuael had with the Soviet
Jews was in the process of resettlement, Early
Sovlet-Jewlsh hUlllgrants caused a need for a speciflc
format for theLr llbllorptlon, and this need was Hlled by
the qua~i-governmental organizatIon known a~ the Jewi~h
Agency, which worked hand in hand with its true
govetnmental counterpatt, the "'b~orption Mlnl~try. These
organization~ were re~pons1ble for acqu1ring temporary
housing, the buIlding of permanent home~, the tecrultment
and training of absorption staff, hiring language teacher~
and social workers, .,1"nn1ng "nd implementing training
cour~e~, illnd dealIng with the acceptillnce of immigrillnt
student~ to I~rilleii univet~itles.8 With the centralization
of the ab~orption process, a ~pecific template for
immigration from the Sovlet Union was laid.
A Soviet-Jewish immigrillnt to I~rael began his journey
wLth the plane flight to Israel, Which was until October
1990 a two-stillge affair. The first stage was typically on
ill Hungarian, RomanIan, Or Polish charter flight, and the
second on the national airline of Israel, El .1'.1.' After
October 1990, direct flights to Israel from the Soviet
union were allowed.~~ The air fare for all immigrants was
p.aid for by the Israeli government. Upon arrival in
Israel, the immigrants were allowed one phone call each to
the Soviet Union at no cost. The Lmmigrants were given
free taxi rides to their destinations. Those with nowhere
to go were either lodged in hotels free of charge for two
weeks, or taken to an Absorption center where they could
stay until they found an apartment. Before they left the
airport, they registered wIth the Absorption Ministry and
obtained an Ldentl.fication card bearing their photograph.
"When they registered, they were gIven an "absorptIon
basket" containing a rights booklet, start-up money rangIng
frON 3250 for an IndivIdual to $3000 for a family,
depending on size, plus an additIonal $125 per person lor
l~dlate needs. During the first year In Israel, a fa~Lly
might be granted up to $15,000 In rent stlpends.~1
~s of 1990, substantLal resentment over the start up
money and the tent stipends had Increased among some
IsraelLs. A factor In this resentment was that landlords
were evicting older tenants to replace them with the
subsidized Sovlet Jews.~2 Rumors circulating about
Immigrants demandIng specific jobs or living places were
also contributlng factors. There e~tsted In Israel a
mlsunde~~tanding of -otlvatlon. The Is~aeli~ thought they
we~e doing the Soviet Je~ a favo~ by taking the~ away f~o~
the Soviet Union, while the SOViet-Jewish immlg~ant felt as
though he had fought hl~ way th~ough a vast bu~eauc~atlc
entity to achieve his end, an end which included
~elnfo~clng the beleague~ed Jewi~h homeland.~~ Although
this fo~mulae ..y have been -ore app~op~iate to the
1..lg~ants of the seventies and eighties, su~ely the sa~e
type of gap In pe~ception continued th~ough 1990.
Absorption Successes
D~. Theodore F~ledgut, the senio~ lectu~e~ in RU~51an
studies at the Heb~ew Unive~slty Ln Je~usale~, has
IClentl£leCl 1913 dS a ttJrnlnq point for the absorption of
there _., • large, settle<l community 0' Sovlet Jews
'"
ISI"el '0 ease ", tI"nsitlon perIoCl '0< neWel Immigrants.
Also,
'"'
on",olnq 'tom KIppur W" 0' late 1913 helpeCl
proCluce • cohesive bonCl between .ll Israelis, includIng ".
newcomers from ", USSR. ••
"
points
"0' that from 1913
on, ISIael's re-emi",ration late was one of the lowest In
the worlCl at five pelcent.~~ Such an encouraqln", statistic
indicated that the absorption proc"ss did have its
successes.
A 1914 survey conducted on SovIet-Jewish immigrants
showeCl that while the social Ufe and the socIal status of
the immIgrants underwent very little net chan",e, thelr
stanClarCls of ltvlng had risen stgnlflcantly.~· With the
shattering Soviet economy of 1990, most of the
Soviet-Jewish immigrants could probably say that their
standard of living increased with the move to Israel as
well. The Immigrants of the seventies, el",hties, anCl 1990
ACCQrCllng to FlleClgut, by this timeSoviet Jews in ISIael.
were greeted in the same manner' an unreserved welcome by
the government and the people as well, Even the Israell
citizens dIscomforted by the mass of imml",rants 100keCl at
the situation wlth aplomb. Said one such citizen, echolng
a phrase from the 1949 Ingathering of holocaust VIctims,
"The situation Is Impossible, but not hopeless.H~'
There were ... and are ... advanta",es in the SOViet-Jewish
migration for the Israeli government as well. The more
JeW'5 In [",r,sel, the II>OIe secure <l pLace that nation h." Ln
the Middle East. For 50~ reason, the Jewish population
does not increase as East liS that of the Atabs. In ,,/Illy
1990, Israel was 60 percent Jewish, but the Jewish
de..oqraphlc advanta'll! wLll end by the year 2020. U Every
plane load of Soviet Jews pushes that date back II lIttle
further. Also, one of ["'<let's p<.lrpalle" Is to be a
tlomelllnd and hilven for all Jews. and every SovIet J ..w who
co.es to Israel t~kl!s the state one step closer to
fulf 111lnq I ts purpose.
"
Conclusion: The Prolllise
It 15 estlllllllted by the 15raeI1 government that
Sovlet-Jewish Immiqt~tlon wlll account for one milllon
i~lgrants In the yeats 1"1 to l"5. i This total increases
Israel's population by 25 percent, and Is comparable to the
United States absorbing the natton of France. The soviet
Union will be hard pressed to allow sO many of Its highly
trained and educated eltl~ens to depart, but the nat ton
will profit lIlOte froll the freedolll their departure h.. ralds
rhan ho... theIr presence within its boundarl ..s. The
emIgrants are searching for new lives, and If they r ..turn
to Israel they will be well taken care of by those that
calle before the•. And Israel? Israel cOlles that llIuch
closer to gathering all of his children together. Although
that wlll undoubtedly present proble~ rIght now, th.. state
of Israel has met IDllny such problelftS In Its past and has
somehow prevailed over them all. As Absorption Minister
Ylt~hak Peret~ states, ·tn the short run. it's a great
proble.. tn the long run, it's II grellt promise.· ..
Append llC
T.bles and Graph!!
J9
Emigration from the U.S.S.R. since 1968
Table 1
Year Jews wno lett ThoS8lO VOM Jews woo left Those 10
the U.S_S.A. ,,,.. the U.S.S.R. ,,,..
1968 229 231 1980 21471 7570
1969 2979 3033 1981 9447 1558
1970 1027 999 1982 2688 734
1971 13022 12819 1983 1314 387
1972 31681 31652 1984 896 340
1973 34733 33477 1985 1140 348
1974 20628 16816 1986 914 206
1975 13221 8531 1987 8155 2072
1976 14261 7279 1988 18961 2173
1977 16736 8348 1989 71142 12101
1978 28864 12192 1990 200279 183400
1979 51320 17614
Table 1. EmIgration from the USSR since 1968. CompIled
fro~ Goodman, 22 and Israeli Embassy, telephone
conversation.
• The obvious discrepancies In the InItial data reflect
the diffLculties Ln securlnq reliable data for tho5e
early years. The fIgure" given are the most relIable
for the IndivIdual cateqorles.
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Flqure 2. Soviet £m~9r"tlon. Compiled frOIll OOOdlllall, 22;
IlIlaell £mbalilly, telephone converllatlon; and
Pelu, NU.S. Closed Door," 4,3,1.
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